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Sentencing mentally disordered offenders: new hybrid orders
The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 ('CSA 
1997') is regarded by many as one of the 
most contentious pieces of criminal 
justice legislation ever to reach the statute 
book. Its provisions were subject to 
widespread criticism from the point 
when former Home Secretary, Michael 
Howard, heralded its 'two strike' 
automatic life sentences, 'three strike' 
mandatory minimum sentences and 
restrictive early release scheme in his 
1995 Party Conference speech, through 
to the Bill being rushed through its final 
parliamentary stages prior to the general 
election. Moreover much of the most 
potent criticism emanated from the 
senior judiciary. Overshadowed by the 
almost exclusive concentration on these 
widely publicised measures, the Act has 
also introduced a new hybrid sentence 
for mentally disordered offenders. 
Despite the comparative lack of attention 
that this development has attracted, it has 
the potential to be as revolutionary in its 
impact as those measures that have 
fuelled the controversial reputation of the 
legislation.
Certain provisions of the Act were 
brought into force by statutory 
instrument on 1 October 1997. As these 
included the new hybrid order it is 
particularly important that its existence is 
brought out of its present obscurity' and 
that the ramifications of its introduction 
receive wider recognition and discussion.
by Estella Baker
The purpose of this paper is to assist in 
this process. It will begin by explaining 
the changes introduced by the legislation, 
taking a critical look at its provisions; it 
will then briefly consider the 
circumstances behind their introduction 
and will conclude by addressing the 
present and luture implications of the 
new orders for the development of policy 
towards mentallv disordered offenders.
THE NEW HYBRID ORDER
Section 46 of the CSA 1997 introduces 
the new orders. Although executed 
through the insertion of two fresho
sections into the Mental Health Act 1983 
('MHA 1983'), for clarity of explanation 
they will be referred to throughout the 
body of this article as orders under the 
1997 Act. The novel departure that they 
represent arises from their deliberate 
combination of therapeutic and punitive 
characteristics which creates a hybrid of 
objectives that English law has previously 
attempted to keep separate. In essence, 
what the Act now permits is for the 
Crown Court to order that a prison 
sentence (other than a mandatory life 
sentence) is served in hospital rather than 
prison. The conditions for making the 
new order are that the court is satisfied, 
on the basis of written or oral medical 
evidence from at least two doctors, that:
(1) the offender is suffering from^ ' o
'psychopathic disorder' within the 
meaning of the MHA 1983;
(2) the disorder is of a nature or degree 
that makes detention in hospital for 
treatment appropriate;
(3) that such treatment is likely to 
alleviate or prevent a deterioration 
of the offender's condition (the 
'treatability criterion').
Where these conditions are met and at 
least one of the doctors concerned gives 
oral evidence before the court, a 'hospital 
direction' and 'limitation direction' may 
be made in respect of the offender, 
provided that the court is also satisfied 
that arrangements have been made for 
hospital admission to occur within 28 
days. Behind this apparently 
straightforward measure nestles ao
complex set of questions regarding the 
interaction of the new power with pre­ 
existing sentencing provisions, not to 
mention others introduced by the CSA 
1997 itself. Partly so as to shed light on 
these, it is helpful to examine more 
closely the mental health law features of 
the new measure, before considering itso
sentencing aspects.
MENTAL HEALTH LAW
Those familiar with the MHA 1983 
will notice a strong resemblance between 
the terms of the inserted provision and 
those already contained in that Act. At 
least one of the doctors giving evidence to 
the court must be approved under s. 12 
of the 1983 Act as having: 'special 
experience in the diagnosis and 
treatment of mental disorder'.
Apart from the fact that the new orders 
apply exclusively to psychopathic 
disorder, the medical criteria reflect 
those required under s. 47 of the Act, 
which empowers the Home Secretary to 
transfer a sentenced prisoner to hospital 
for treatment. Consequently, it is no 
surprise that a 'hospital direction' takes 
effect as a 'transfer direction' under that 
section. Similarly, the 'limitation 
direction' takes effect as a 'restriction 
direction'. Under s. 49 of the MHA 1983 
the minister enjoys the discretion to 
make the latter direction in addition to a 
transfer direction. Its significance is that 
it confers the status of 'restricted patient' 
upon the prisoner so that decisions 
regarding discharge from hospital, leave 
of absence and transfer to another 
institution, may only be taken with the 
minister's consent. The intention in 
placing these procedural restrictions on 
those charged with the patient's 
treatment is to ensure that considerations 
of public safety' are given priority when 
the relevant decisions are made.
Clearly there are some differences 
between the transfer powers of the 
minister and the new disposal introduced 
by the CSA 1997. In the latter the court 
is obliged to impose restrictions on the 
patient's management because it is 
mandatory to add a limitation direction 
to a hospital direction. In addition the
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court must be informed by oral medical 
evidence in reaching its decision, whereas 
there is no obligation on the minister to 
obtain such information before making a 
restriction direction. This does not 
mean, however, that the evidential 
requirements placed upon courts by the 
new legislation have no precedent; they 
are based on another provision of the 
1983 Act.
Rather than the powers of transfer 
given to the Secretary of State, the pivotal 
sections of the 1983 Act that apply to 
mentally disordered offenders are the 
court disposal powers in s. 37 and 41. 
Under s. 37, which is cast in equivalent 
terms to s. 47, a magistrates' court or the 
Crown Court may make a 'hospital 
order' as an alternative to imposing a 
custodial sentence. Section 41 then gives 
the Crown Court (only) the discretion to 
add a 'restriction order' to the hospital 
order, thereby turning the offender into a 
restricted patient and putting in place the 
restrictions summarised above. However, 
before it can make the restriction order, 
the court must hear oral testimony from 
at least one of the doctors giving evidence 
for the purposes of s. 37. Thus the origin 
of the medical evidence requirements 
attached to limitation directions can be 
seen. But what is the purpose of the 
medical evidence?
Although there is no express 
declaration in s. 41 a court cannot 
impose a restriction order unless: 'it 
appears ... necessary for the protection 
of the public from serious harm' to make 
the offender subject to the restrictions 
imposed by the order. It is obvious from 
this that restriction orders are targeted at 
offenders who are both disordered and 
dangerous. Consequently, by implication, 
the purpose of the medical testimony is 
to assist the court in assessing the 
offender's dangerousness. This view was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Birch 
(1990) 90 Cr App R 78, the guideline 
case on restriction orders. However it 
should be noted that the court 
emphasised that the statutory obligation 
extended only as far as hearing the 
evidence. Where the doctor 
recommended a particular course of 
action, the court did not have to adopt it 
as the ultimate responsibility for assessing 
the offender's dangerousness rested with 
the judge. Given that courts have no 
choice under the 1997 Act but to 
superimpose a limitation direction upon 
a hospital direction, the dangerousness
criterion in s. 41 of the MHA 1983 is not 
reproduced and the requirement of oral 
testimony looks redundant. Nevertheless, 
it has been suggested that, in this contextoo '
too, testimony is likely to centre on the 
question of risk (Eastman and Peay, 
Sentencing Psychopaths: Is the 'Hospital and 
Limitation Direction' an Ill-Considered Hybrid 
[1998] Crim LR 93 at 100).
SENTENCING ASPECTS
On the sentencing side, the 
observations are more of omission than 
comparison, since the 1997 Act is silent 
on most pertinent matters. Considering 
the hvbrid orders in isolation, one of the 
most fundamental issues that arises is 
how sentence length is to be fixed. No 
guidance is provided by the legislation, so 
the premise must be that the 
new powers can be used in 
conjunction with any prison 
sentence (other than a 
mandatory life sentence), 
and that sentence length will 
be set according 
to ordinary sentencing 
principles. Theoretically, 
then, the statutory 
sentencing framework of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 
(CJA) (as amended) will 
apply. Section *2(2)(a) of the 1991 Act 
establishes the normal desert-based rule 
that the length of the sentence must be 
commensurate with the seriousness of 
the offence. But this is subject to what 
the 1997 Act has ensured is an evolving 
list of exceptions.
The contributions made by the new 
automatic 'two strikes' life sentences and 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
trafficking offences, both of which have 
come into force, have been added to the 
original exception provided by the 1991 
Act itself. Section 2(2)(b) of the latter Act 
enables a court to pass a longer than 
commensurate sentence (not exceeding 
the maximum penalty for the offence) on 
an offender who has been convicted of an 
offence defined as 'violent' or 'sexual' 
where, in the court's opinion, doing so:
'is necessary to protect the public jrom 
serious harm from the offender'.
For reasons discussed below, it should 
be noted that there are strong echoes of 
s. 41 of the MHA 1983 in this provision.
Length of sentence
At first sight, apart from the fact that 
the hybrid orders must be implemented
in the context of a considerable catalogue 
of problems associated with general 
sentencing law, there may not appear to 
be any intrinsic difficulty in pinning a 
hospital and limitation direction to a 
prison sentence, whatever its underlying 
rationale. But reflection suggests that a 
number of important questions will arise 
in relation to the determination of 
sentence length. First of all, in some 
instances, courts will be faced with a 
fundamental contradiction between the 
criteria by which sentence length is 
determined and the therapeutic ambition 
that prompts the direction that the 
sentence should be served in hospital. 
This can be illustrated by the principles 
that have been established for the 
imposition of restriction orders.
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Section 41 of the MHA 1983 provides 
for orders of both fixed and 
indeterminate duration. However in Birch 
the Court of Appeal reiterated earlier 
advice that cases in which a determinate 
order is appropriate are exceptional, 
since it is highly unusual to be able too J
predict with any degree of certainty how 
long an offender will remain a danger to 
the public. Similarly, it is easy to imagine 
a parallel conflict arising where the 
medical evidence suggests that theoo
offender's disorder is of long-term 
duration but, in sentencing terms, either 
the offence deserves a comparatively 
modest sentence and none of the
exceptions enabling a longer term to ber o o
imposed apply, or the permitted 
extension is relatively short.
At least three responses to the 
occurrence of such a case can be 
anticipated. One possibility is that the 
doctors would be unwilling to declare the 
offender 'treatable', taking the matter out 
of the court's hands. Alternatively, a court 
might decline to direct the offender to 
hospital on the grounds that it would be 
pointless to do so. Thirdly, the court 
might make the necessary directions in
reliance on the fact that, should the 
disorder outlast the sentence, the 
offender could be detained at its 
conclusion through the use of the civil 
powers of the MHA 1983. Whatever the 
result the outcome is an unhappy one. 
Responses one and two would help to 
perpetuate the current situation in which 
it is not only known that significant 
numbers of offenders are improperly 
detained in prison (Gunn et al, Mentally 
Disordered Prisoners (1991), Home Office, 
London), but that they are detained in 
conditions that are neither designed nor 
expected to cater for their needs (Knight 
v Home Office [1990J 3 All LR 237). On 
the other hand, response three threatens 
to undermine the credibility of any claim 
that the length of an order has been fixed 
as a proportionate response to the 
offence, reproducing a well-rehearsed 
criticism of the injustice that can result 
from 'ordinary' hospital orders.
What of the converse situation where a 
longer than commensurate sentenceo
under s. 2(2)(b) of the 1991 Act is an 
issue? It has been suggested that it is hereoo
that the role of the oral medical evidence 
may assume critical importance. Like 
s. 41 of the MHA 1983, s. 2(2)(b) is a 
dangerousness assessment provision. 
There is no statutory requirement in the 
CJA that the court should obtain medical 
evidence before passing a longer 
sentence. But the Court of Appeal has 
indicated that it is good practice to do so 
(Fawcett (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 55), 
repeating the established position in 
relation to the imposition of 
discretionary life sentences (Virgo (1988) 
10 Cr App R (S) 427), which are 
themselves defined by the CJA as 
s. 2(2)(b) sentences.
It has already been seen that, under the 
1997 Act, the court must hear oral 
medical evidence before imposing a 
limitation direction. If it is right that this 
evidence will focus on the question of 
risk then it has been pointed out that it 
may be used for a double purpose as 
simultaneously justifying the imposition 
of a longer than commensurate (or 
discretionary life) sentence (Eastman and 
Peay). From a civil libertarian viewpoint, 
this is a matter of some concern. If the 
guidance in Birch is applied to limitation 
directions, which is likely since the 
wording of the legislation is identical to 
that in s. 41 of the MHA 1983, then the 
courts will not regard themselves as 
obliged to follow medical
recommendations to send offenders to 
hospital to serve their sentences. 
Nevertheless the effect of exposure to the 
medical evidence may be to draw certain 
matters to the sentencer's attention that 
would not otherwise have been 
considered. As a result, one effect of the 
new statutory 
provisions may be 
to encourage the 
elongation of 
sentences for 
potentially eligible 
offenders, 
regardless of 
where they are to 
be served.
Dangerousnesso
prediction is 
notoriously inaccurate. 1 heretore any 
expansion of its use as a basis for 
decision-making is objectionable in 
principle and should be resisted. 
Secondly, as already noted, prison is not, 
and is not intended to be, a suitable 
environment for detaining individuals 
with mental health problems. 
Consequently, given that the population 
under discussion is, by definition, on the 
threshold of compulsory hospitalisation, 
the propriety must be questioned of 
introducing a measure which has the 
capacity' to increase the likelihood that 
such individuals will be imprisoned for 
longer than would otherwise have been 
the case.
RELATIONSHIP OF HYBRID 
ORDERS
Having considered the new orders in 
their own terms, it is now appropriate to 
examine their relationship with other 
forms of sentence and disposal. The first 
point to clarify is that the hospital and 
limitation directions constitute an 
addition to the courts' armoury. 
Therefore their introduction must be 
reconciled with those measures that were 
previously available. The legislation 
provides some indication as to how this 
should be done, since it specifies that the 
power to impose the new orders only 
arises when the court has already 
considered the possibility' of making a 
hospital order, and has dismissed it in 
favour of passing a prison sentence. 
There is one exception to this rule, 
however. Where the offender is subject 
to an automatic life sentence under the 
f997 Act, the court must proceed 
directly to consider whether the 
conditions for a hospital and limitation
direction are satisfied, since s. 37 of the 
MHA f983 has been amended to deny 
this group of offenders eligibility for a 
hospital order. Leaving aside this atypical 
group, some observations can be made 
about the sequence of decisions that 
must now be followed in 'ordinary' cases.
As mentioned earlier, allowing for the 
fact that the new orders are applicable 
only to offenders suffering from 
psychopathic disorder, the medical 
criteria that support the making of a 
hospital direction match those found in 
s. 37 of the MHA 1983. Logically, this 
implies that where a court eventually 
makes a hospital direction, its reasons for 
rejecting a hospital order cannot arise 
from lack of satisfaction of the medical 
conditions but must be dependent on a 
criterion that the two disposals do not 
share. In practice, however, this is only 
partially true, since Birch suggests one 
circumstance in which offenders might 
now end up serving a prison sentence in 
hospital, despite qualifying for a hospital 
order. Therefore there are two situations 
in which a court might be inclinedo
towards imposing the new orders.
The first is generated by the further 
condition in s. 37 that, before a court can 
make a hospital order, it must be:
'oj the opinion, having regard to all the 
circumstances including the nature oj the 
offence and the character and antecedents of 
the offender, and to the other available 
methods of dealing with him, that [it is] the 
most suitable method of disposing of the case.'
As the Court of Appeal confirmed in 
Birch, the effect of this provision is to 
preserve the court's discretion to pass a 
prison sentence, even where the medical 
criteria to support a hospital order are 
satisfied. But the guidance in Birch went 
further giving rise to a second possibility 
As has been seen, in a case where the 
court reaches an initial conclusion that a 
hospital order is appropriate, it must 
then consider whether to exercise its 
discretion under s. 41 of the MHA 1983
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to conjoin a restriction order. According 
to the Court of Appeal, part of the 
sentencer's deliberations at this stage.o
should include a reconsideration of 
whether to send the offender to prison 
(Birch (1990) 90 Cr App R 78 at p. 87). 
Some such offenders might eventually 
end up in the hospital and limitation 
direction pool by this route.
When the proposal to introduce a 
hybrid order was first mooted, however, 
it was not primarily intended to cater for 
either of these types of cases, but rather 
to overcome difficulties associated with 
the concept of psychopathic disorder and 
applicability of the treatability criterion.
TREATABILITY OF 
DISORDER
Psychopathic disorder is a highly 
controversial concept. Clinicians disagree 
about how such disorders should be 
classified and whether and how they are 
treatable. Inevitably this has knock-on 
consequences for the operation of the 
MHA 1983. Under the scheme of the 
legislation, psychopathic disorder is 
classified as a minor disorder, meaning 
that sufferers are not regarded as 
hospitalisable per se because they are not 
so disordered that they are unable to fend 
for themselves in the community. 
Consequently, the treatability criterion 
was included in the admission criteria in 
order to provide a safeguard against 
compulsory detention in circumstances 
where hospital treatment was unlikely to 
do any tangible good. In practice, 
however, it has long been alleged that 
doctors have fostered it in such a way as 
to protect them from patients that they 
do not wish to treat. This is not to 
suggest, however, that their reticence inoo ' '
accepting responsibility for relevant 
individuals is unfounded. It is clear that 
such patients do present exceptionally 
demanding challenges and that some are 
genuinely untreatable.
Viewed specifically in the context of 
s. 37, the clinical uncertainties present 
two inter-related difficulties. First, they 
cause a reluctance to declare 
psychopathically disordered offenders 
'treatable' within the meaning of the Act, 
potentially denying beneficial therapy. 
But this basic reluctance is then 
exacerbated by a second, practical 
consideration. Where offenders are 
declared treatable but, subsequently, the 
assessment turns out to be erroneous,
compulsory hospitalisation has proved to 
be a dead end. The patient cannot be 
transferred to prison because a hospital 
order is not a sentence and, very often, 
they cannot be discharged because the 
relevant criteria are not met, or they are 
thought unsuitable for return to the 
community because of anxieties about 
dangerousness.
PRISON IS UNSUITABLE
Prison is not, and is not intended to be, 
a suitable environment for detaining 
individuals with mental health 
problems. Consequently, given that the 
population under discussion is, by 
definition, on the threshold of 
compulsory hospitalisation, the 
propriety must be questioned of 
introducing a measure which has theo
capacity to increase the likelihood that 
such individuals will be imprisoned for 
longer than would otherwise have been 
the case.
The measures introduced by the CSA 
1997 are apt to deal with the 
transferability issue. Although serving 
sentence in hospital, the offender is 
nevertheless a prisoner and so 
legitimately liable to punishment in 
prison if found to be untreatable (or 
treatment proves successful prior to 
sentence expiry). However, it is worth 
noting that the reforms made by the 
legislation are not as far reaching as those 
proposed by the initiators of the hybrid 
orders. The original proposal was made 
by a joint Department of Health and 
Home Office Working Group on 
Psychopathic Disorder (the Reed 
Committee) that reported in 1994. 
While the committee had suggested that 
the duration of the order would be set by 
the court according to desert criteria and 
that it would be classified as a punitive 
sentence, they had envisaged that the 
question of where the order would be 
served would then be determined on 
purely clinical grounds. This does not 
entirely tally with the model established 
bvthe 1997 Act.
This paper has concentrated on 
drawing attention to some specific 
problems with the provisions introduced 
by the f 997 Act. However, in conclusion, 
it is important to complement these 
detailed observations by highlighting the
J O O O
wider significance that the new orders
may have for policy towards mentally 
disordered offenders.
Official policy towards the mentally 
disordered who come into contact with 
the criminal justice process was 
summarised in Home Office circular 
No. 66/90. It provides that such 
individuals should be diverted into 
mental health care at as early a stage as 
possible, reinforcing its message with a 
comprehensive set of appendices that are 
designed to remind all relevant agencies 
of their powers pursuant to putting the 
policy into effect. It cannot be denied 
that there is telling evidence that
O
implementation of the policy is far from 
perfect since criminal justice populations 
include a significant cohort that iso
mentally disordered (see, for example, 
Gunn et al). Nevertheless, the existence 
of what accumulates to a rich array of 
formal and informal diversionary 
mechanisms provides tacit evidence of a 
genuine and long-standing commitment 
to this particular policy approach.
Viewed in these terms, it is all the 
more apparent that the introduction by 
the CSA 1997 of an order that 
intertwines punitive and therapeutic 
goals constitutes a significant re- 
orientation of policy. Those who regard 
this as an undesirable development may 
comfort themselves that the scope of the 
new provisions is limited to offenders 
suffering from psychopathic disorder. 
Given that many of the difficulties 
associated with this condition stem from 
its ambiguity as a form of mental disorder 
and/or criminality, it may not be 
inappropriate to respond by tailoring an 
equally ambiguous form of disposal to 
match. However, while it may be 
tempting to take refuge in this 
rationalisation, the reassurance it 
provides may be short-lived. The 
legislation vests the Secretary of State 
with the power to extend the application 
of hospital and limitation directions to 
include 'mental disorder of such other 
description as may be specified in the 
order'. Therefore the issues raised by the 
CSA f997 may acquire far wider 
relevance than might initially appear. This 
is a further reason why these novel forms 
of sentence deserve wider 
debate. ®
Estella Baker
